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COMMENTARY 
The Role of Judges 
in Life/Death Decisions for the 
Neurologically Impaired 
H. Richard Beresford,  MD, JD 
The Massachusetts supreme court has recently ruled that decisions about withholding care from hopelessly ill, 
legally incapacitated patients must be made  by  judges. I t  clearly rejected the view t h a t  families and  at tending 
physicians should be empowered to make  such  decisions. In this respect, the ru l ing  contrasts with that of the 
Qlriulan case and highlights the issue of  whether judges or physicians and families are better able to make medically 
and morally sound decisions respecting this class o f  patients. 
Beresford H R  T h e  role of judges in life/death decisions for the neurologically impaired. 
Ann Neurol 4:463-464, 1978 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently ruled 
that judges have thc final authority to make life/death deci- 
sions for legally incompetent patients [a]. The ruling has 
greatly perturbed the Massachusetts medical community 
because i t  seems t o  bar attending physicians and families 
from agreeing among themselves to withhold care from 
hopelessly ill persons who arc legally incapacitated [2, 71. 
The ruling contrasts with that of the Quinlun casc, in which 
the New Jersey supreme court empowered family, attend- 
ing physicians, and a hospital "ethics committcc" to act 
jointly to remove a respirator from a severely brain- 
damage(/ adult [ 5  1. Both courts agreed, however. that it is 
lawful to withhold therapy from hopelessly ill patients if 
the treatments promise nothing more than to prolong a 
noncognirive or minimally cognitive existence. 
The Saikewicz Case 
Thc focus of decision i n  the Massachusetts case was Joseph 
Saikewicz, a profoundly retarded (IQ. 10; mental age. 2% 
years) G9-year-old man who had spent most of his life in 
state institutions. When he developed acute leukemia in 
1976, his attending physicians recommended against che- 
motherapy. But because he was incapable of participating 
in decisions about his care, the confining institution asked a 
probate judgc to appoint a Ruardian t o  act for him. When 
notified of the situation, his two sisters declined to partici- 
pate in  the guardianship hearing o r  t o  assume any role in 
his care. A bwardian was then appointed and promptly rec- 
ommended that Saikewicz not bc treated becausc he had an 
incurable illness for which treatment offered little prospect 
of benefit and was likely to cause great discomfort. 
The probate judge ordcrccf thar chemothcrapv be with- 
held, although hc conceded that it might prolong life and 
that most cornpetcnt and informed persons with analogous 
leukemias elect t o  receive it. He considercd that the pa- 
tient's age, his inability to cooperate in treatment. the 
likelihood o f  distressing side-effects, the low probability of 
remission, and the dubious quality of  life if remission were 
obtained outweighed any possible therapeutic benefits. 
The  judge then asked the state supreme court t o  determine 
if a probate court has general authority to issue such an 
order and if the order in the instant case was correct. The 
high court answered both questions affirmatively but with- 
held its written opinion for over a year. In the interval, 
Saikewicz died of pneumonia, having received no trcat- 
ment for his leukemia. 
The  belated written opinion of the Massachusetts su- 
preme court reasons that because legally competent per- 
sons have a constitutional right to refuse medical care, in- 
compctents should be accorded a similar right. Although 
incompetents have no decision-making power, the doctrine 
of  substituted judgment enables lawfully appointed guard- 
ians and judges to act on their behalf. The guardian's role is 
to try to ascertain the incompetent's preferences; but, if 
these preferences arc unknowable, the guardian should Je- 
termine what choice a reasonable person in the incompe- 
tent's situation would make. In the court's view, the mcdi- 
cal evidence supported the guardian's conclusion that a rea- 
sonable person in Saikcwicz's position would decline 
treatment. It  cautioned, however. that its ruling should not 
be read as a devaluation of Saikcwicz's life, even though his 
impaired cognition was a factor in weighing the rca- 
sonableness of treatment. 
Having concluded that withholding life-prolonging care 
may be appropriate in some cases, the court prescribed a 
judicially oriented procedure for making decisions. Thus, in 
the event a question arises as to whether to withhold care 
from an incompetent person, a petition must be filcd with a 
probate court for appointment of a guardian. Once ap- 
pointed, the guardian must make a thorough investlgation 
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and present to the court “all reasonable arguments in favor 
of administering treatment to prolong the life of  the indi- 
vidual involved” 191. The  coun then decides whether 
treatment shall be administered or withheld. In reaching its 
decision, the court may avail itself of the opinions of  medi- 
cal experts or “ethics committees,” but it is not required 
either to seek or to follow such advice. To emphasize that 
the power of decision rests firmly with the probate judge, 
the state supreme court noted that it takes “a dim view of 
any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making responsi- 
bility away from the duly established courts . . . to any 
committee, panel or group, ad hoc or permanent” 191. 
Considerat ions 
The court’s ruling raises several challenging questions, but 
perhaps the most immediate is this: Does the court really 
mean that probate judges must make all decisions about all 
life-prolonging care for all hopelessly ill incompetents, be 
they brain-damaged or minors? If so, one can anticipate a 
sharp expansion of  the dockets of probate courts in Massa- 
chusetts and a contraction of  the activities of hospital com- 
mittees [6]  established to assist in decisions about care of 
the hopelessly ill. As noted by Dr Relman [7], the number 
of cases potentially subject to the court‘s ruling is not in- 
considerable, and only a well-staffed, medically sophisti- 
cated, highly efficient probate court system could effec- 
tively handle them. If the Massachusetts supreme court 
envisions a narrower scope for its ruling, then at some 
future time it will need to spell out more precisely when 
the jurisdiction of the probate court must be invoked. In 
the meantime, Massachusetts physicians and families must 
either go to c o u n  if they wish to withhold care from 
hopelessly ill and legally disabled patients, or else quietly 
evade the mandate of the court’s decision and risk civil or 
criminal liability. 
As with the Quinkan decision, the impact of Saiknvirz in 
other states is unpredictable. A striking aspect of the 
Saiknuin opinion is the court’s distrust o f  private 
decision-making by attending physicians and families, 
whether or not it is buttressed by the opinion of an “ethics 
committee.” Why the court thinks that judges are more 
likely to make correct decisions than those most intimately 
concerned with an ill person does not clearly emerge from 
its opinion. Perhaps it believes that judges have more re- 
fined ethical sensitivities than physicians, or that families 
may have nonaltruistic motives for withholding treatment 
from a hopelessly ill person. The “gravitational effect” [3] 
of Saikewirz may therefore depend on how lawmakers 
elsewhere weigh the comparative abilities of judges, on the 
one hand, and physicians and families, on the other, to 
arrive at medically and morally defensible decisions. As 
Professor Goldstein has suggested, because no objectively 
right o r  wrong answer exists in these cases, there is no 
compelling reason to prefer judicial decisions to private 
agreements [4]. 
Both Quinlan and Saikewin assume a societal consensus 
about the rightness of allowing some hopelessly ill persons 
to die. Where they differ is in the choice of decision-maker. 
Quinhn would leave the decision to family, physicians, and 
a committee; Saiknvin places the responsibility on a pro- 
bate judge. Other  alternatives are to make physicians the 
primary decision-makers, to allow physicians and families 
to decide without the intervention of  a committee or  a 
court, or to allow families alone to decide once they have 
received an unequivocally hopeless prognosis from an at- 
tending physician. If the Qainlan and Saiknvicz courts ac- 
curately interpret the public will, it would be unthinkable 
to issue a blanket prohibition against withholding presump 
tively futile treatments from the legally disabled. 
Because more litigation about withholding care from the 
hopelessly ill is likely, legislation may be helpful [I] .  Such 
legislation might specify the types of  cases in which with- 
holding care may be considered and establish a procedure 
for decision-making. It could identify the decision-makers. 
define the role of comminees or panels. and provide for 
access to the courts in the event that a prescribed proce- 
dure fails to produce agreement on  the level of care. If  the 
legislation permits private decision-making, it could 
explicitly protect the participants from any civil or criminal 
liability. 
The alternative to legislation is more judge-made law. If 
Saikewin is any portent. the trend may be to increase the 
role of judges in specific decisions about levels of medical 
care. If this pattern indeed develops, one would hope for 
judges who are both skilled evaluators of medical data and 
good moral philosophers. One  would also hope that they 
are capable of  exercising these talents in situations which 
call for very prompt decisions. But even if such judges are 
abundant, the question will remain why they are better 
suited to decide when to stop medical care for the 
hopelessly ill than persons who are more knowledgeable 
about prognosis or more passionately involved in the ill 
person’s fate. 
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